

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 04409-85 3 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Charles E. Allen

National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

and Narcotics

SUBJECT:

Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting

Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 15 August 1985 to discuss the following issues: the terrorist threat to Chile; Libyan terrorist threat to the Sudan; Syrian/Palestinian terrorism in Western Europe; terrorist challenge to the Persian Gulf States; and foreign terrorist threat in the US. Attached is my report.

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Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting

Main Discussion Items

A. The Terrorist Threat to Chile

1. Discussion

leftist Allende regime, Presiden from moderates and radical lefti and the Communist Party (PCCH) i	ersary celebrating the overthrow of the the Pinochet faces a rising tide of opposition sts as antiregime protests continue to grow ntensifies its recent campaign of bombings
and attacks against the regime.	

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We do not believe the Communist Party and the Chilean left are ready at this time to enter into a full-blown conflict with the Chilean military to topple Pinochet. Over time, this may become an objective. They are prepared, however, to use terrorist tactics now to discredit and wear down Chilean security services, destabilize the regime, and harass and provoke Pinochet into reimposing a national "state of siege" (lifted last June) which will result in new repressive measures and thereby polarize the populace.. This will:

- Discredit Pinochet's claim that the internal security situation is under control.
- Provoke considerable adverse international publicity for the Pinochet regime.
- Force the military high command to break ranks and possibly remove Pinochet from office.
- Persuade the populace that Pinochet can only be removed by means of violence.

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The Communists are also using terrorism to retaliate against recent killings of Communist members by police officials and right-wing death squads. Terrorists are also increasingly targeting US-related facilities. US installations were the target of only one terrorist attack in 1982, but the number of attacks increased to 15 in 1984, and 19 so far this year. Targets have included the US Consulate, Chilean Binational Center at Rancagua, and the Mormon Church. The increased frequency of the attacks and growing lethality clearly put US citizens at increased risk in Chile.

growing lethality clearly put US citizens at increased r	isk in Chile.
The nature of the latest round of terrorist attacks more central direction and coordination of terrorist act PCCH. The Communists are reported to be growing more coviolent tactics are working. This is in part due to inc	ivities by the onfident that their
Soviet Union and some of its satellite and client states	
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B. Libyan Terrorist Threat to the Sudan	
1. <u>Discussion</u>	
The potential for Libyan terrorist oper grow. Since President Nimeiri's ouster in no time in laying the groundwork to replace Libyan-style government if the opportunity infiltrate large numbers of Sudanese radica Sudanese Revolutionary Committees (SRCs) in	April, Colonel Qadhafi has wasted the transitional regime with a arises. He continues to also belonging to the Libyan-backed
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Qadhafi also may be considering terrori and facilities in the Sudan through the use	e of Sudanese surrogates. He has
drawn parallels between terrorist operation helped "liberate" the country from US influ	uence, and Libyan goals in the
Sudan. In five major speeches since the be senior lieutenant Abdal-Salam Jallud have e	extolled the use of suicide
terrorist tactics against the United States US influence from the Sudan, and Libyan-bac	cked Sudanese could target US
facilities and personnel if his agents succenti-US sentiment in the Sudan.	ceeded in whinning un enough 25%
Sudanese demands for Cairo's return of form to stand trial could provide the necessary	
Sudanese officials are unable to provid	
Embassy and have warned US personnel to be	
Libyans in the Sudan over the political pac	is an apparent division between 2 ce and the extent to which
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D. <u>Terrorist Challenge to the Persian Gulf States</u> 1. Discussion	
In the Gulf region, the several conservative states of the Persian Gulf have entered a period of growing terrorist challenge which—when combined with increased political, economic and subversive problems—could destabilize some of our friends and allies in the region over the next three to five years. Several characteristics make these states particularly attractive targets for Iranian and Syrian terrorism. They are conservative monarchies that are repugnant to both religious zealots and leftist revolutionaries; several have substantial populations of disaffected Shias; and they have large numbers of expatriate workers whose loyalties lie elsewhere and whose foreign ties are difficult to monitor, much less control. Moreover, the assassination attempt on the Amir of Kuwait in May and the recent discoveries of arms smuggling in Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates raise serious questions about these regimes' ability to protect themselves.	
Trends would indicate that both Iran and Syria can be expected to mount more terrorist operations in the Gulf. Kuwait has witnessed five major terrorist attacks since the bombing of the US Embassy in 1983. Radical Shias belonging to the Iranian-backed Dawa Party probably were responsible for the attempt on the life of the Amir, suspect that Damascus was responsible for the recent bombings of two crowded cafes in Kuwait last June because Assad is displeased over a reduction in assistance from the Kuwaiti government.	25X 25X
believe these groups, including the Dawa Party, have long-range plans and assets in Bahrain to assassinate government leaders.	25X 25X 25X1
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E. Foreign Threat in the US

I. UISCUSSION	
Sikh extremism continues to pose the greatest threat. The Sikhs believed to be responsible for the Air India disaster and the airport bombings in Japan remain at large and pose a high threat to Rajiv Gandhi during his scheduled attendance at the UN General Assembly in New York and the Commonwealth Conference in the Bahamas in October.	
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